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are in fact a global problem and have been in 
use for a considerable period of time. Wher-
ever the militarily weak or poorly resourced 
confront superior forces with advanced tech-
nologies in armed conflict, IEDs provide an 
ideal weapon in much the same way landmines 
do. Throughout modern history, states, indi-
viduals, and criminal and terrorist groups have 
used them to murder, intimidate, extort and 
destabilize the infrastructure of government 
and undermine the rule of law.
In the mine-action community, IEDs, al-
though often recognized as significant threats 
where prevalent, are not generally understood 
or analyzed in any depth. As a result, the ad-
vice provided for mine-risk education and the 
formulation of procedures that humanitarian-
demining and battle-area-clearance person-
nel must adopt for IED removal and disposal 
are questionable. A number of possible reasons 
exist as to why mine action has failed to in-
corporate effective countermeasures to IEDs. 
Primarily, the International Mine Action Stan-
dards have never fully addressed the subject. 
As a result, the expertise required to properly 
analyze the impact of IEDs and thereby iden-
tify the requirement for action has not been 
resourced. No generic doctrine exists to form 
a basis for the development of IED standard 
operating procedures, IED-risk education, 
country assessment and threat analysis, for 
both the security of personnel and the conduct 
of mine clearance and related operations.
In Figure 1, the IED threat is shown by the 
number of IED incidents occurring in sample re-
gions and countries during 2008, and those re-
corded from 1 May through 30 June 2009. From 
the data provided, the number of incidents is 
Figure 1: IED incidents for selected regions and countries in 2008 and during May/June 2009.
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I t is well-reported that improvised explo-sive devices create a lethal and prevail-ing threat that is responsible for hundreds 
of deaths across the globe each month. The 
question of how the escalating presence of 
IEDs will impact mine action should be ad-
dressed, alongside the issue of how we can 
improve our understanding of the threat and 
what actions need to be taken to reduce it.
IEDs have become synonymous with the 
ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. To 
an outsider (based on media reporting) IED 
use by terrorists and insurgents appears to be 
focused solely in these theaters; however, IEDs 
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This article addresses the increasingly prevalent threat of improvised explosive de-
vices around the world. The author carefully defines this often unpredictable and un-
conventional “weapon of choice” and outlines the steps to eliminate the hazard it 
presents to global security. The article also discusses the role IEDs play within the 
scope of mine action, arguing their danger exceeds that of traditional mines and other 
unexploded ordnance. 
This illustration shows the construction of an IED used to destroy the U.n. building in Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003.
GRAPHIC COURTESY OF HAzARD MAnAGEMEnT SOLUTIOnS
1
King: IEDs and Their Impact on Mine Action
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2009
56         special report | the journal of ERW and mine action | fall 2009 | 13.3 13.3 | fall 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | special report         57
What is an IED?
According to the Landmine Monitor Re-
port 2008, an improvised explosive device is 
“a device placed or produced in an improvised 
manner incorporating explosives or noxious 
chemicals. An IED may be victim-operated or 
command-detonated. Victim-operated IEDs 
are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but 
command-detonated IEDs are not.” 1 
IEDs are normally categorized by their 
method of initiation, such as timer-activated, 
command-fired or victim-operated. They are 
then further subcategorized by their explosive 
effect: blast, blast/fragmentation, incendiary or 
blast/incendiary. The method of delivery is a 
further type of classification, e.g., to the target— 
vehicle-borne IED, person-borne IED (suicide) 
or water-borne IED. Each method of initiation 
has its advantages and disadvantages, and the 
perpetrator will normally decide on the meth-
od of employment by the type of target to be 
attacked and its accessibility. For example, for 
exact targeting of a vehicle convoy, command-
fired IEDs with a large payload offer the great-
est opportunity for success for the perpetrator, 
who can choose the precise time of detonation 
to overcome a vehicle’s armor and attack the 
individuals inside. In other circumstances, a 
time-initiated IED may be better-suited, where 
escape of the bomb-layer is deemed essential 
and command firing cannot be considered due 
to the security infrastructure or the nature and 
situation of the target. Suicide IED attacks can 
be carried out at any location, providing secu-
rity can be negotiated, and suicide bombers 
have perpetrated some of the most devastat-
ing attacks. Victim-operated devices, although 
essentially random, can be targeted, such as in 
the form of an under-vehicle IED. Until recent-
ly, IED incidents generally occurred as a result 
of planned and targeted attacks on individuals 
or organizations. Currently, however, IEDs can 
be utilized almost anywhere, in any location 
or terrain, and in any area of the battlefield, 
where inevitably they will eventually impinge 
on mine-action operations and activities. In 
Afghanistan, for example, IEDs are used as 
a tactical weapon, targeting Internation-
al Security Assistance Force troops and af-
fecting force mobility, but IEDs also have the 
capability to considerably affect operational 
aims and even strategic planning. They are 
used in Afghanistan to deny ground, protect 
troop positions and serve as an early warning 
of attack in much the same way as a conven-
tional alarm mine. In Colombia and Nepal, 
IEDs are also employed as a protective mea-
sure in the same way as a defensive minefield, 
but they are sometimes placed with the facili-
ty to fire the devices on command as opposed 
to being victim-operated.
Current trends in IED manufacture indi-
cate a growing use of command-fired devices, 
especially those employing a radio signal as 
the method of arming and initiating. This 
progression is one seen globally, with perpe-
trators taking advantage of communications 
and radio technologies available worldwide. 
Insurgents used radio-controlled IEDs in Iraq 
in most attacks on Coalition Forces, where 
remote-controlled roadside bombs caused 
many casualties in the mid-stages of the re-
cent conf lict. Electronic countermeasures were 
then developed to jam the insurgents’ radio sig-
nals as forces travelled through the range of 
the device’s radio receiver. Insurgents respond-
ed by introducing infrared switches armed re-
motely by radio signal outside the range of the 
electronic-countermeasure equipment, where a 
passing vehicle or foot patrol could trigger the 
device. Afghanistan has shown similar trends, 
but instead of infrared switches, electronic-
countermeasure equipment is defeated by us-
ing long command wires from a distant vantage 
point with a good view of the device location. 
Recently, however, as command-wire detec-
tion procedures have become more successful, 
simple victim-activated devices have been used 
in significant numbers. These IEDs are manu-
factured using predominately nonmetallic and 
clearly very high, and although fatalities and inju-
ries are not given, they are likely to be significantly 
higher than those caused by landmines. Landmine 
casualties are rarely high for a single incident, 
whereas an IED contained in a truck and initiated 
in a busy marketplace can claim tens or even hun-
dreds of victims. In Iraq alone during 2007, 5,480 
civilian deaths were recorded as a result of multi-
fatality bombings,3 whereas 5,426 casualties were 
recorded globally for mine-related injuries, includ-
ing victim-operated IEDs for the same period.1 
These IED statistics have not been included as a 
comparison to mine-related injuries, but simply 
to show the prevalence of IED use. 
Dealing with a booby-trapped cache of IED components buried inside a refuse bin.
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the IMAS documentation, there is the ability to 
publish technical annexes for complex weapon 
systems or specialist EOD tasks. As an interim 
measure, IEDs and IED-disposal operations 
could be addressed in such a document, giving 
basic knowledge, generic standard operating 
procedures for search-and-disposal action, and 
the corresponding minimum equipment re-
quirements—including the personal protective 
equipment required for demining operations in 
locations where IEDs may be encountered. 
Clearing IEDs presents the deminer with 
a number of difficult decisions. Unlike a land-
mine or item of unexploded ordnance, IEDs are 
improvised to the extent of the imagination of 
the bomb-maker, so there is no guide or dia-
gram that can be followed to formulate a struc-
tured neutralization or disarming plan. There 
are, however, courses of action to take based on 
assessment of the threat conditions and by a pro-
cess of deduction, evaluation of the likely type of 
device, and the best method of clearance. How-
ever, due to the nature of the task and even with 
the benefit of knowledge and experience, IED 
defeat operations are often only calculated leaps 
into the unknown, where the level of specialist 
training and equipment sophistication can be 
critical in achieving a successful outcome.
MRE, although normally of a very high stan-
dard, rarely addresses IED threats in full, which 
vary between regions and countries in the same 
way as a landmine or UXO threat. Inclusion of 
an IED module in such education programs 
should be considered a priority where the threat 
exists and affects daily life, and the program 
must include an accurate threat analysis of the 
country or area in question. Generic briefings, 
although they have their place, may not correct-
ly address specific threats, leaving critical gaps 
in knowledge that could lead to the use of inad-
equate drills and regimes. IED briefings should 
also form part of any pre-deployment training 
for mine-action staff, whatever their level of in-
volvement. Personnel designated to operate in 
post-conflict areas where the ground situation 
has not been fully resolved should expect to be 
targeted by IEDs and must therefore receive ap-
propriate education before they are deployed.
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Conclusion
IEDs pose an unconventional and relatively 
unpredictable threat. They cannot be countered 
by traditional means. Mine-action personnel, 
although used to following convention and 
doctrine within regulated organizations, will 
be at risk if they continue to serve without con-
sidering the growing global use of IEDs. These 
devices will continue to kill and maim a great-
er number of innocent victims than mines or 
UXO for the foreseeable future. They are the 
“weapon of choice” for non-state actors, and 
their use is widespread. It is inevitable that 
those actively involved in mine-action opera-
tions will encounter IEDs far more frequently 
than ever before. Intervention at the clearance 
level is occurring now, and we must ensure that 
personnel are equipped with a thorough assess-
ment of the risk, and that adequate provisions 
are made to mitigate threats. 
See Endnotes, Page 79 
nonmagnetic materials, making them difficult 
to locate with conventional detection equip-
ment. 
As technology development has advanced in 
countering the IED threat, the perpetrators have 
responded by changing their methods of attack 
and device construction. Therefore, defeating the 
device is now considered just one element of a 
much broader effort in which substantial multi-
faceted resources are now being applied to inter-
cept the IED attack cycle at all levels (such as at the 
stage of device manufacturing, or even sourcing 
device components). The ultimate objective is to 
stop the device from being laid in the first place.
Mine-action Implications
Within the International Mine Action Stan-
dards, IEDs do not feature prominently as be-
ing a target for specific clearance activity. They 
are referred to in the levels of qualification for 
demining/explosive-ordnance-disposal operations, 
but this reference is not in detail. The ability of 
a mine-clearing entity to competently deal with 
IEDs, should they be encountered, is left to spe-
cialist mine-clearance staff, who may be inad-
equately prepared. 
Organizations undertaking mine-clearance 
tasks rely heavily on the employment of per-
sonnel with military or similar backgrounds 
to undertake the more difficult EOD tasks, and 
IEDs certainly fall within this category. How-
ever, this reliance is a dangerous precedent, as 
nations’ training standards for IED disposal 
vary considerably, and the differing levels of 
expertise can present a risk to civilians and the 
individuals undertaking IED disposal tasks. 
This fact has been clearly illustrated by NATO 
operations in Afghanistan where inadequate-
ly trained and equipped personnel have been 
killed performing tasks beyond their capabil-
ity and where national EOD doctrine did not 
include IED-disposal operations.
Much more could be done to establish generic 
operating procedures for deminers and imple-
ment basic instructions for assessing and deal-
ing with IEDs. Under the current structure of 
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A U.S. soldier guards a road in Afghanistan where the command wire for an IED was found, August 2009.
3
King: IEDs and Their Impact on Mine Action
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2009
